Winter 1977 Review by War College, The U.S Naval
Naval War College Review
Volume 30
Number 1 Winter Article 26
1977
Winter 1977 Review
The U.S Naval War College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.
Recommended Citation
War College, The U.S Naval (1977) "Winter 1977 Review," Naval War College Review: Vol. 30 : No. 1 , Article 26.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol30/iss1/26
1War College: Winter 1977 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1977
2Naval War College Review, Vol. 30 [1977], No. 1, Art. 26
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol30/iss1/26
3War College: Winter 1977 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1977
4Naval War College Review, Vol. 30 [1977], No. 1, Art. 26
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol30/iss1/26
PRESIDENT'S NOTES 
These Notes, written as 1976 draws 
to a close, provide an opportunity to 
summarize various program initiatives of 
interest to our readers. (Moro compre­
hensive treatment will follow in my 
Report to the Navy's Leadership-Past, 
Present and Future now at the printer.) 
With regard to the curriculum, the 
process of consolidation and refinement 
continues following the fundamental 
change in education concept Admiral 
Turner introduced. This year we have a 
substantial electives program. Students 
will have the alternative of a term paper 
or a formally evaluated elective course 
each trimester. The Strategy and Policy 
trimester for the College of Naval War­
fare offers, among a number of elective 
opportunities, two of the politico­
military games developed by the 
Studies, Analysis and Gaming Agency of 
the Joint Staff. These are games nor­
mally played by cabinet-level and four­
star officers. The object is to provide 
our senior students with an opportunity 
to tie together the recurring themes of 
policy they have studied-and to exer­
cise them at high-level decisionmaking 
under conditions of stress. If these 
games prove as successful as I expect, 
they may well play a larger role in the 
College's future electives program. 
Former students will remember the 
now 19 year old Naval Electronic War­
fare Simulator (NEWS)-a war gaming 
system now made obsolete by the evolu­
tion of naval warfare and by advances in 
gaming technology. The CNO has ap­
proved full funding in FY 1979 of a 
completely digitalized, high-capacity 
replacement for the NEWS which will 
meet the Navy's needs for the next 
15-20 years. Professor Tom Weschler
will head the team which has been
tasked to develop the concept for utili­
zation of this new facility in the Naval 
Operations curriculum. We expect to 
provide terminals in Norfolk, San Diego 
and Hawaii to facilitate high-level fleet
use. 
The Center for Continuing Education 
is taking the Naval Operations curricu­
lum on a trial basis to the nuclear 
submariners in New London, and has 
embarked on a self-administered semi­
nar program in the field to be con­
ducted under the leadership of Naval 
War College graduates. Our corre­
spondence courses are being reduced in 
length so that each section can reason­
ably be accomplished in one year. 
The Center for Advanced Research 
continues to produce work of a caliber 
which warrants formal dissemination to 
the fleet. Development of a highly 
sophisticated tabletop gaming capability 
will be completed this year. We expect 
that this new capability will prove to be 
of great value in staffs and wardrooms 
as a means of increasing the competence 5
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Mao's death not only marks an easily identifiable period in Chinese history, but it 
also is an appropriate occasion to examine the change from the post• World War II 
structure of international relations to a new one, whose outlines are now dimJy 
visible. Using the U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia as his focal point, Professor 
Thornton describes !he complexities of the tripolar relations among the United 
States, the Soviet Union and Communist China. He argues that the United States 
ulilized the Chinese interest in a balkanized Indochina to extricate itself from 
Vietnam. He concludes that once the United States achieved this goal, it was in our 
national interest to have a strong, united and Soviet�oriented Vietnam on China 1s 
southern flank in order to reinforce the Jong-term adversary relationship between the 
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. 
TOW ARD A NEW EQUILIBRIUM? 
TRIPOLAR POLITICS, 1964-1976 
hy 
Richard C. Thornton 
The past 12 years begin to take on 
the aspect of an historical watershed 
separating the earlier structure of inter• 
national relations which emerged in the 
aftermath of World War H from a new 
equilibrium which has not yet evolved 
but whose main outlines now seem 
dimly visible. The questions are; What 
were the primary catalytic factors 
forcing change in this period? How did 
the United States, the Soviet Union and 
the People's Repub lic of China react to 
the crises and opportunities each faced 
during these years? What impact will 
Mao's death have on the likely shape of 
the future equilibrium? 
The p rotracted conflict in Southeast 
Asia must occupy a prominent place in 
any attempt to comprehend the under• 
lying reasons accounting for change. 
The Vietnam vortex involved aach one 
of the powers in major decisions still 
imperfectly understood. This essay is an 
attempt to assess the strategic impact of 
that conflict on the power and position 
of the United States, the Soviet Union, 
and the People's Republic in an effort 
to identify with greater clarity the 
general outline of the emerging strategic 
balance. 
Year oi· Decisions, 1964·1965. 
Lyndon B. Johnson, upon assuming 
office after the assassination of Presi­
dent John F. Kennedy, sought to refrain 
from taking any overt action with U.S. 
forces in Southeast Asia which might 
further intensify the conflict there. By 
early 1964, however, it was clear that 
the combined North Vietnamese-Viet• 
cong {NV NVC) assault, begun the 
previous December, would topple the 
South Vietnamese government if no 
countermeasures were taken. The 
Based on a paper presented at the National Security Affairs Conference 1 National Defen4e 
Univer11ity, July 1976. 7
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Concern over the past decade with insurgency and counterinsurgency has tended 
to obscure the distinction between a revolution and an insurgency. The revolutionary 
rejects a government's Jegitimacy and in doing so denies its right to enforce rules and 
laws, The essence of the revolutionary's claim is that I1e is right. This claim is 
tJltimateJy based on a concept of justice: men make a revolution when they are 
convinced they are unjustly treated, In a world characterized by a growing gap 
between the rich and the poor nations, the United States cannot .afford to ignore the 
claims of other nations and peoples for justice. 
SOME PERSPECTIVES ON REVOLUTION 
h)' 
Thomas II. Grnssey 
For many years people in the United 
States argued that the outcome of the 
Vietnam conllict would have c ritical 
implications for the future of freedom 
everywhere. The familiar argument ran: 
If the Communists were victorious1 
Western security would be weakened; 
but if the Communists were defeated in 
Vietnam1 we would have met HThe 
Third Challenge," "Wars of l,iberation," 
and convinced the enemy that he could 
not succeed in world conquest by 
proxy. 
The insurgency in Vietnam finally 
has reached its conclusion. Perhaps now, 
more than a decade after American 
combat units were introduced to help a 
friendly government deal with an ex• 
ternally supported insurgency and 3 
years after those forces were withdrawn 
*This essay is based on a lecture given in, 
August 1975 at the Naval Amphlbious 
.Schooi1 Coronado, California. 
under "peace with honor/' it is possible 
to see why our counterinsurgency effort 
failed. 
The paragraph has an odd ring to it. 
There is something strange•·· and in that 
strangeness we may find at least part of 
the answer to the question1 
11 Why did 
our counterinsurgency efforts fail?" Try 
reading the paragraph again, subt.tituting 
revolution for insurgency and counter­
revolutionary f or counterinsurgency. 
What I wish to examine, therefore, is 
not Vietnam but the fundamental con• 
ceptuat errors of which Vietnam was 
merely a symptom. For if we mis­
conceived the situation1 our loss might 
not be as ominous as we had feared; if1 
however, our misconceptions con� 
tributed to or even caused our faiJure 1 
we must correct them before they are 
repeated. 
How we define situations, what 
labels we attach to realities, which 
words we use in thinking about the 
23
War College: Winter 1977 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1977
24
Naval War College Review, Vol. 30 [1977], No. 1, Art. 26
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol30/iss1/26
25
War College: Winter 1977 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1977
26
Naval War College Review, Vol. 30 [1977], No. 1, Art. 26
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol30/iss1/26
27
War College: Winter 1977 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1977
28
Naval War College Review, Vol. 30 [1977], No. 1, Art. 26
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol30/iss1/26
29
War College: Winter 1977 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1977
30
Naval War College Review, Vol. 30 [1977], No. 1, Art. 26
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol30/iss1/26
31
War College: Winter 1977 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1977
32
Naval War College Review, Vol. 30 [1977], No. 1, Art. 26
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol30/iss1/26
33
War College: Winter 1977 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1977
30 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 1rnvmw 
The American experience in Southeast Asia was marked by confusion and 
strongly held views. For a while emotion and political passion seemed to drown out 
reasoned analysis. Now that these events are in the past, scholars, participants, and 
interested observers can consider them and1 hopefully, add to our understanding of 
them. One such example is Gareth Porter 1s book1 A Pt1acc Denied, of which 
Lieutenant Colonel Sauvageot was oriqina11y asked to write a book review. Because 
of his extensive1 unique and intlmate participation in the events Porter discuss<.,!.<;1 we 
felt a lengthy article based on A Peac(i Denied would be appropriate. 
A Peace Denied: The United States, 




Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army 
Gareth Porter has made an important 
contribution to understanding the 1973 
Agreement on Ending the War and 
Restoring Peace in Vietnam.* Analyzing 
the agreement in the context of the 
interests and capabilities of al1 parties 
involved, Portet' realizes (correctly in 
my view) that the Paris Agreement can 
be understood only as part of the 
political-diplomatic history of the con­
flict1 or as a reflection of the basic 
continuity of policies in Hanoi, Saigon, 
and Washington over the past 20 years 
on the question of a negotiated settle­
ment, 
Unfortunately I an essentially valu­
able effort is maned by some lack of 
rigor coming apparently from the au­
thor's own preferences. Readers with 
*Gareth Porter, A Peace Deniod: The 
United Slates, Vietnam and the Paris Agrcc­
mont (Bloomington: Indiana University Pres:., 
1976), 357pp. 
the same emotional preferences as the 
author's will not be encouraged to be as 
critical of some of their concepts. as 
they should be. Readers who have 
strong emotional identification with 
U.S. policy or with those of the Repub­
lic of Vietnam may let their biases clash 
with the author. The rn,ult is all too 
likely to be a rejection of valid interpre­
tation and correct examples to support 
the interpretation. 
Still, much of Porter's material is a 
good antidote for the American reader 
whose exposure to executive br anch 
interpretations and whose simple ethno­
centrism have Jed him to believe that 
only Hanoi violated the Agreement, 
Porter not only shows that this is not 
true; he explains why it is not true. In 
short, the Agreement favored the Com­
munists, was so perceived by both Viet� 
namese parties to the conflict and 
naturally enough influenced the atti­
tudes and approaches that both side, 34
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The modern international system can be traced to the Treaty of Westphalia, 1648. 
At that time the principles of the sovereign equality of states, and nonintervention 
by one state in the internal affairs of another state were established. So long as the 
various states in the international system are ideologically oriented along more or less 
the same lines, these principles do not really conflict. However, given the mutually 
antagonistic and irreconcilable ideologies of the free World and the Communist 
world today, the principles of sovereign equality and noninterventi'on require 
balancing and adjustment. The policy of detente is one such attempt. 
INTERVENTION AND DETENTE 
IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLl<:Y 
by 
Robert S. Wood 
In the century after the 1648 Treaty 
of Westphalia, the European state sys­
tem was established on the basis of the 
political principle of territoriality and of 
the legal principle of sovereign equality. 
The former notion entailed the effective 
control by the major princes within 
established territorial limits and the 
second concept established the norm of 
complete political jurisdiction by the 
prince and his government within these 
territorial boundaries unencumbered by 
any earthly, external authority. Al­
though states were unequal in material 
capabilities and political influence, they 
confronted each other in the interna• 
tional arena under the obligation to 
recognize each other as masters within 
their territorial domains. And, in the 
intercourse of nations, agreements were 
to be based on the norm of contracts, 
explicit or implicit, among equal part­
ners, whatever the actual power political 
realities underlying their calculus, States 
organized according to exclusive in• 
ternal authority and interstate relations 
organized not by a supranational power 
but by the sovereign agreement of these 
states-this was to be the pattern of 
modern international relations. Linked 
with this pattern were the notions of 
nonintervention and domestic jurisdic• 
tion-princes may meet each other in 
battle and adjust the political map of 
Europe but they must resist the urge to 
influence too blatantly the character of 
each others type of regime and ideo­
logical commitment by direct or covert 
intervention. That this conception of 
international affairs was only im­
perfectly realized is obvious but that lt 
provided an influential normative frame 
of action is also clear. 
The evolution of the principles of the 
modern state system is attributable in 
the first instance to the experiences of 
45
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Between World Wars I and II the national interests of the United States in the Far 
East outstripped our capability to defend them by force of arms. The official 
resolution of this security problem was established in agreements reached at 
Washington in 19221 one of which was the limitation of size and composition of the 
U.S. Navy and other navies. Many naval officers disagreed with the concepts 
underlying this security system, which did not survive Japanese expansionism in the 
decade before Pearl Harbor. 
THE UNITED STATES NAVY-STRATEGY AND 
J;'AR EASTERN FOREIGN POLICY, 1931-1941 
by 
Michael K. Doyle 
The Pacific phase of the Second 
World War was almost exclusively an 
American Naval operation. As such it 
was, just as U.S. Navy war planners in 
the 1920', and 1930'• had anticipated 
in their Basic War Plan ORANGE, a 
"war, primarily naval" in its prosecuw 
tion. The vast expanse of the Pacific and 
the great distances separating the nation 
from its outlying possessions clearly 
dictated that in a war with a Far Eastern 
enemy the U.S. Navy would have to 
bear the brunt of the fighting. It would 
also be responsible for the logistical 
support of American ground forces 
whose mission it would be to dislodge 
the enemy from the many island groups 
and archipelagos of the Pacific. But 
these same planners: had also been aware 
of the almost insurmountable diffi. 
culties of a farwflung naval campaign in 
the Western Pacific. Many of these 
difficulties Navy planners attributed to 
the shortsighted nature of American Far 
Eastern diplomacy beginning with the 
Washington Conference of 1921-1922. 
Theoretical discussions among officers: 
in the Offiell of Naval Operation,, 
papers prepared by the General Board 
of the Navy, and Operations Probiems 
and theses done at the Naval War 
College in these years all concluded that 
the United States would be at a severe 
disadvantage from the outset in a war 
against Japan, t 
These dismal conclusions never 
officially surfaced in the Navy's war 
planning1 yet they were common knowl­
edge. The Navy's Basic War Plan 
ORANGE for use in a Japanese­
American war was formulated in con­
junction with the Army members of the 
Joint Army-Navy Board. Basic War Plan 
ORANGE called for the rapid advance 
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Technological advances may have significantly changed the instrwnents with 
which modem war is waged, but armed confJict between organized military forces 
retains the essentiaJ characteristics of historic combat Despite the luvoc frequently 
wrought by armed conflict, certain restraints or pro11ibitions on what actions the 
combatants may take have been established in international law, Professor Levie 
discusses some of the restraints which apply to all members of ,urned forces, 
by 
lloward S. Levie 
Combat restraints fall into two sepa• 
rate and distinct categories: ( 1) Re• 
straints on the use of particular weap­
ons, such as the prohibitions on the use 
of dumdum bullets and poison gas; and 
(2) restraints on the actions that may be
taken during the course of combat, such
as the prohibitions on the denial of 
quarter and on the shooting of civilian
noncombatants. The discussion which 
follows will be concerned solely with
this latter type of restraints on permis­
sible combat actions.
Most of these restraints, of both 
categories, have their origin in custom 
which has evolved over long periods of 
time, Many of these customs have been 
codified, primarily at The Hague in 
1899 1 and 19072 and at Geneva in 
19293 and 1949. 4 However, they have 
not all been codified and, accordingly 1 
there are stm some rnles for which we 
must have recourse to custom. At the 
first successful codification in 18991 in 
order to leave no doubt in this respect, 
it was agreed that the preamble of the 
convention being drafted should include 
a provision (which has become known 
as the deMartons Clause, after its au­
thor) to the effect that apart from the 
rules codified in the Regulations then 
being adopted, "populations and 
belligerents remain under the protection 
and empire of the principles of interna­
tional law, as they result from the 
usages established between civilized 
nations, from the laws of humanity, and 
the requirements of the public con­
science. 05 
There are, of course, a very larqe 
number of restraints on the actions that 
may be taken during the course of 
combat. The four specific areas of com­
bat restraints which will be discussed 
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